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Abstract—Process Control Systems (PCSs) are the operat-
ing core of Critical Infrastructures (CIs). As such, anomaly
detection has been an active research field to ensure CI
normal operation. Previous approaches have leveraged network
level data for anomaly detection, or have disregarded the
existence of process disturbances, thus opening the possibility
of mislabelling disturbances as attacks and vice versa. In this
paper we present an anomaly detection and diagnostic system
based on Multivariate Statistical Process Control (MSPC), that
aims to distinguish between attacks and disturbances. For this
end, we expand traditional MSPC to monitor process level
and controller level data. We evaluate our approach using the
Tennessee-Eastman process. Results show that our approach
can be used to distinguish disturbances from intrusions to a
certain extent and we conclude that the proposed approach can
be extended with other sources of data for improving results.
Keywords-Process control systems, Multivariate Statistical
Process Control, Tennessee-Eastman,
I. INTRODUCTION
Process Control Systems (PCSs) are at the core of Critical
Infrastructures (CIs), as they control, automate and monitor
most of the processes that power modern societies. Power
generation, transport, critical manufacturing, water treatment
and fuel transport are some examples of CIs. As such, it
is necessary to protect PCSs and related assets in order to
ensure the correct functioning of modern societies.
This necessity has been further revealed by the existence
of security incidents directly related to PCSs where skilled
attackers disturbed normal functioning of PCSs, affecting
the surrounding environment, some of them concerning CIs.
Examples of successful cyber-attacks involving PCSs with
physical impact include Stuxnet [1] and the German Steel
Plant incident [2].
Consequently, PCS security has been the object of con-
siderable research attention, specially in the development
of novel security mechanisms. Among these mechanisms,
Anomaly Detection Systems (ADSs) have a prominent
space. The predictable and static nature of PCSs make them
suitable candidates for anomaly detection [3]. However,
when detecting a particular anomalous event in PCSs, the
factors that cause it can be diverse. These factors can
be classified in two large sets: process disturbances or
malfunctioning, and attacks or intrusions.
In this paper we analyze the limitation and possibilities of
distinguishing process disturbances and intrusions by using
Multivariate Statistical Process Control (MSPC) in a process
agnostic manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents related works in the literature. Section III introduces
Multivariate Statistical Process Control. Section IV outlines
our approach while Section V evaluates it experimentally.
Finally, Sections VI and VII extract some conclusions and
draw some lines for further work, respectively.
II. RELATED WORK
Anomaly detection in PCSs and industrial environments
in general has gathered wide attention from the scientific
community.
While most of the approaches leverage network level data
to detect anomalies in PCSs (see survey [3]), other proposals,
such as ours, address this task by leveraging process and
sensor-level data.
When dealing with process level data, proposals can
be further classified in two subgroups: (1) solutions that
require a model of the monitored process to detect anomalies
and (2) approaches where modelling the process is not
necessary. Process model dependant contributions include
the work of McEvoy and Wolthusen [4] and Svendsen
and Wolthusen [5]. While effective to detect anomalies,
these approaches require accurate modelling of the physical
process. This requirement poses an important obstacle for
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Figure 1. Example of a control chart. Control limits are presented for 95%
(lower dashed line) and for a 99% (upper dashed line) confidence levels
implementing detection systems of this nature, especially in
complex processes. More process-independent approaches
on the other hand, include the work of Kiss et al. [6] and
Krotofil et al. [7].
Kiss et al. [6] present an anomaly detection technique
based on the Gaussian mixture model clustering of the
sensor-level observations. Later, they use silhouette examina-
tions to interpret the results. Nevertheless, they only consider
attacks as possible factors for abnormal situations in the
process, without considering process faults or disturbances.
Therefore, process related anomalies could be mislabeled as
attacks and vice versa.
Krotofil et al. [7] propose a method to detect when
attackers tamper with sensor signals. To this end, they use
entropy to detect inconsistent sensor signals among a cluster
of correlated signals. Although they consider scenarios with
process disturbances, there is no direct comparison between
tampered sensor signals and similar process disturbances.
In this approach, we go beyond the state of the art by
presenting a novel security anomaly detection and diagnosis
technique for PCSs. Additionally, we also analyze the effect
of process disturbances and its effect when detecting security
anomalies.
III. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL PROCESS CONTROL
Figure 1 shows an example of a control chart. Under
normal process operating conditions, 99% of all the points
will fall under the upper control limit. In that case, we
consider that the process is in a state of statistical control.
It is important not to confuse the term statistical control
with other similar terms, such as automatic feedback control,
as they refer to different concepts. Statistical control refers
to the state of the process where only common causes of
variation are present [8].
The existence of consistent observation series over the
established control limit, is likely to be attributed to a new
special cause. In the case of PCSs, this variation source
may be attributed to attacks or process disturbances, i.e. an
anomaly.
By using tools such as Principal Component Analysis
(PCA), MSPC provides an efficient methodology to monitor
variable magnitude and relation to other variables.
A. PCA-based MSPC
Let us consider process historical data as an X =
N × M two-dimensional dataset, where M variables are
measured for N observations. PCA transforms the original
M -dimensional variable space into a new subspace where
variance is maximal. It converts the original variables into a
new set of uncorrelated variables (generally fewer in num-
ber), called Principal Components (PCs) or Latent Variables.
For a mean-centered and auto-scaled1 X and A principal
components, PCA follows the next expression:
X = TAP
t
A +EA (1)
where TA is the N × A score matrix, that is, the original
observations represented according to the new subspace;
PtA is the M × A loading matrix, representing the linear
combination of the original variables that form each of the
PCs; finally, EA is the N ×M matrix of residuals.
In PCA-based MSPC, both the scores and the residuals are
monitored, each in a separate control chart [9]. On the one
hand, to comprise the scores, the D-statistic or Hotelling’s
T 2 [10] is monitored. On the other hand, in the case of the
residuals, the chosen statistic is the Q-statistic or SPE [11].
D and Q statistics are computed for each of the ob-
servations in the calibration data, and control limits are
set for each of the two charts. Later, these statistics are
also computed for incoming data and plotted in the control
chart. When an unexpected change occurs in one (or more)
of the original measured M variables, one (or both) of
these statistics will go beyond control limits. Thus, a M -
dimensional monitoring scenario is effectively converted into
a two-dimensional one.
In this work, we consider an event as anomalous when
three consecutive observations surpass the 99% confidence
level control limit.
Once an anomaly has been detected, we use oMEDA
plots [12] to diagnose the anomaly causes by relating anoma-
lous events to the original variables. In essence, oMEDA
plots are bar plots where the highest or lowest values in
a set of variables reflect their contribution to a group of
observations. Therefore, when computed on a group of
observations within an anomalous event, the most relevant
variables related to that particular event will be the ones with
the highest and lowest bars.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
Figure 2 shows an example of a PCS. At the core of the
system resides a physical process, with a fixed number of
sensors and actuators. These sensors and actuators are the
1Normalized to zero mean and unit variance
Actuators
Sensors
Physical Process
Controller(s)
Figure 2. Example of a PCS and used attack model.
input/output devices that controllers use to interact with the
process. Controllers read process data from the sensors, and
according to the control algorithm implemented in them,
they decide what is the next step to be performed on the
actuators. Once the actuators change, the process evolves
and with it, the sensor reading. Then, sensor data is fed to
the controllers again, thus repeating the steps.
However, the communication between process controllers
and sensor/actuators is often performed over insecure trans-
mission lines, frequently using unencrypted, unauthenti-
cated, legacy protocols. Thus, it is possible for an attacker
to interact with the communication, performing Man-in-the-
Middle (MitM) attacks.
This can lead to situations where the data fed to the
controller is not the real read by the sensors, or that the
actuators receive data that was not sent as such by the
controllers.
In this work we use MSPC over a simulated industrial
process, the Tennessee-Eastman [13], to detect anomalies
and diagnose their cause distinguishing between natural
(disturbances) and human induced (attacks) factors.
A. Tennessee-Eastman process
The Tennessee-Eastman (TE) process is a well-known
challenge process, modeled after a real chemical process.
First presented by Downs and Vogel [13], it has been
widely used by researchers to test different control strategies.
Though initially designed as a process control challenge,
the TE process has also become a prominent choice among
security research works [4], [14], [7], [6].
In this work we use Ricker’s [15] decentralized control
strategy, along with the added randomness model by Krotofil
et al. [7].
The TE model has 41 measured variables (XMEAS), 12
manipulated variables (XMV) and 20 process disturbances
(IDV) implemented. For a full description of the variables
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Figure 3. Comparison of the evolution of XMEAS(1) under disturbance
IDV(6) or an integrity attack on XMV(3).
and disturbances, refer to [13]. The XMEAS are read by
the controllers, and interact by setting values to the XMVs.
Compared to the simplified Figure 2, XMEAS variables
correspond to the sensor readings and XMVs to the actuator
settings. Process disturbances are unexpected and undesired
changes in process conditions that can affect process normal
operation.
Out of the modelled disturbances, IDV(6) is one of the
most difficult to handle. It models a loss of reactant in an
input feed (Feed A).
The input flux of feed A is measured by XMEAS(1),
whereas XMV(3) is the manipulated that controls the valve
of feed A. Therefore, it is to be expected that attacks on
closing the valve XMV(3) and the existence of disturbance
IDV(6), will affect similarly to XMEAS(1).
Figure 3 shows both situations. When monitoring
XMEAS(1), there is almost no difference between IDV(6)
and an integrity attack on XMV(3) where the attacker
commands closing the valve controlling feed A, as the flow
decreases abruptly in both cases. Both the disturbance and
the attack occur at the tenth hour. After 17 hours and 43
minutes, the process shuts down in both cases as the stripper
liquid level becomes too low to continue safe operation of
the plant.
Having a process disturbance and a potential attack on a
process variable that react almost identically with the process
provides a sound setup to test the performance of techniques
that try to distinguish them.
B. Adversary modelling
The adversary and attack models considered in this sce-
nario are the ones proposed by Krotofil et al. [7].
We consider that the adversary is able to read and manip-
ulate network traffic, between controllers and the physical
process as depicted in Figure 2.
Therefore, the attacker is capable of manipulating input
data both at the controllers’ (forged XMEAS data) and/or
the physical process’ (forged XMV data) end, performing
an integrity attack.
Following the model of Krotofil et al. [7], we consider
an attacked variable Y ′i (t) at time t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T as follows,
where T is the duration of the simulation and Ta the arbitrary
attack interval. An integrity attack is defined as follows:
Y ′i (t) =
{
Yi(t), for t /∈ Ta
Y ai (t), for t ∈ Ta
(2)
where Y ai (t) is the modified variable value injected by the
attacker.
Similarly, during DoS, the attacker effectively stops com-
munication, and no communication reaches the actuator or
the controller. Krotofil et al. [7] define as a DoS attack
starting at ta as:
Y ai (t) = Yi(ta − 1) (3)
where Y ai is the last value received before the DoS attacks.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to evaluate our approach, we conduct a set of
experiments where the randomized TE model is run ten
times per anomalous situation. The model we used for the set
of experiments is the DVCP-TE model presented by Krotofil
and Larsen [16], freely available on Github2. The time length
of each simulation is 72 hours, except in the cases where
the process shut itself down due to safety constraints. For
each simulation hour, variable data is recorded 2000 times,
that is, every 1.75 seconds. Calibration data consists of 30
runs, and this data is used to build the MSPC model and
establish the control limits of the D and Q statistics.
All anomalies start at the 10th hour of simulation. For
each of the anomalous situations, we calculate the Average
Run Length (ARL), that refers to the lapsed time between
the start of the anomalous event and its detection in the
control charts. As previously stated, an event is flagged as
anomalous when three consecutive observations surpass the
99% control limit.
Once an anomaly is flagged, oMEDA charts are computed
for the set of the first observations that surpass control limits
in each of the ten runs in either of the two control charts
(monitoring D and Q-statistic).
For each anomalous event two plots are created, one with
real process data (data the process receives and sends), and
the other with controller level data. Both data sets will be
identical in case of an attack free environment. But, in the
case of attacks, both data sets will diverge.
For the analysis of the process data, and plotting purposes,
we used the MEDA toolbox [9].
We set four different scenarios: a) Disturbance IDV(6),
b) Integrity attack on XMV(3), c) Integrity attack on
XMEAS(1), and d) Denial of Service on XMV(3).
Resultant oMEDA for controller level and process level
variables are shown in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
2http://github.com/satejnik/DVCP-TE
Figures 4b and 5b show the oMEDA charts for the case
of where the attacker performs and attack and closes the
valve of feed A. In this case, from the controllers point of
view, the anomaly is similar to the one with IDV(6). It is
when we look at process-level data that we see that the real
concerned variable is not XMEAS(1). Rather, the attacker
is manipulating XMV(3) to perform the attack.
Figures 4c and 5c shows the oMEDA plots of an scenario
where the attacker manipulates the XMEAS(1) variable
and sets it to zero. Therefore, the controller receives the
information that there is no flow in Feed A. That is why the
XMEAS(1) value from the controller point of view is lower
than usual, because the attacker has set it so. As the control
algorithm tries to tackle the situation, it opens XMV(3)
more, and thus flowing more reactant A to the process. From
the process point of view, that is the reason XMV(3) and
XMEAS(1) have higher values than usual.
oMEDA plots for a DoS attack on XMV(3) are shown
in Figures 4d and 5d. In this scenario, the process keeps
receiving a constant value, previous to the attack. Neither of
the oMEDA plots show a variable, let alone XMV(3) that
stands out clearly among others. It is worth noting that the
ARL, on the other cases almost immediate, in DoS attacks is
significantly higher. In this case, DoS detection takes almost
an hour.
A. Discussion
Our approach detects all anomalous situations of distur-
bances and attacks.
However, when diagnosing an anomaly, controller-based
readings –on witch traditional MSPC has relied on– are not
enough to do so correctly. Both integrity attacks and the
process disturbance are diagnosed in a very similar way, in
a manner that it is not feasible to distinguish what caused
the anomaly.
To address this matter, we have extended the MSPC model
and measure both process and controller level variables.
Having this two level input makes possible monitoring a
wide range of process variables. Moreover, when anomalies
occur, it is possible to distinguish the origin of the anomaly.
When considering DoS attacks, the ARL is significantly
longer than with integrity attacks or process disturbances
and the diagnosis is not as clear as in the other scenarios.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a process-independent approach to
detect and distinguish process disturbances from related
attacks. Unlike previous approaches, it is not a process-
dependant approach and it is able distinguish between dis-
turbances and attacks.
Our methodology is based on MSPC for anomaly detec-
tion and oMEDA plots for anomaly diagnosis. We have used
the popular Tennessee-Eastman process to experimentally
evaluate our approach.
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Figure 4. oMEDA plots of different anomalies from the controller point of view
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Figure 5. oMEDA plots of different anomalies from the process point of view
Distinguishing process disturbances and low level attacks
in PCSs is a complex task, especially if all controller’s I/O
are to be considered compromised.
We extended the traditional MSPC model to monitor
both controller and process level variables, to efficiently
monitor PCSs. Often, PCSs assign measured variables to
the manipulated ones, so this approach is feasible in these
environments. This scenario, would also complicate the work
of an attacker, as it would need to forge both the target
manipulated variable and the associated measured one to
avoid detection.
When analyzing process disturbances or integrity attacks,
the oMEDA plots clearly show the implicated variables. In
the case of DoS, detection time is significantly longer and
the diagnosis with oMEDA is not related to the attacked
variable.
VII. FUTURE WORK
To overcome current anomaly diagnosis limitations, it is
necessary to add more information to the MSPC model.
In the case of PCSs, a promising source of additional
information is the one created at the network level (packets,
flows, logs etc.).
MSPC-like methodologies have already been used in regu-
lar IT networked environments for security monitoring [17].
We are confident that adding network-level variables to
the ones of the process will ease anomaly diagnosis (e.g.
by detecting increased traffic in the case of network DoS
attacks) and will also shorten the ARL required to detect
anomalies, as while the process might be slow to surpass
control limits due to slow dynamics, network variables show
more immediate information.
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